SOFT LAW, RISK CULTURES, AND LAW
ABIDINGNESS:
THE CAREMARK CONNECTION
Donald C. Langevoort*
I. RISK CULTURES ............................................................................822
A. Founding Narratives about Risk ......................................824
B. Risk Selection ..................................................................824
C. The Neuroscience of Collective Risk-taking ...................824
D. Risk Networks..................................................................825
E. Cultural Filtration.............................................................825
II. LEGAL RISK TAKING ...................................................................826
III. THE CAREMARK CONNECTION ....................................................828
IV. DIVERSITY IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE .................................830
V. CONCLUSION: CULTURALLY ASTUTE LAWYERING ....................831
As Vice Chancellor, Chancellor, Chief Justice, and recidivist law
review author, Leo Strine has had much to say about the often-frustrating
effort at corporate behavior modification. One point he makes very
insistently is that pursuant to their state-granted charters, corporations are
authorized to take part only in lawful business, not any profitable business.
Respect for life-giving law is thus a necessary corollary of good corporate
citizenship. But good citizenship is so hard to instill, which irks him. An
angry display of this is Strine’s Delaware Supreme Court dissenting opinion
in City of Birmingham Retirement System v. Good, 1 involving Duke
Energy’s shameless toxic chemical dumping, which led to large penalties.
In contrast to the usual Caremark claim that the board unwittingly facilitated
legal wrongdoing by not putting into place a monitoring system to stop it, 2
* Thomas Aquinas Reynolds Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. Birmingham Ret. & Relief Sys. v. Good, 177 A.3d 47 (Del. 2017).
2. The seminal case is In re Caremark Int’l S’holder Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch.
1996). In that context, the potential liability for breach of fiduciary duty depends on a showing
that the directors of the corporation acted in bad faith by deliberately doing little or nothing
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here plaintiff charged knowing complicity by the board with efforts to
conceal and continue the wrong, in cahoots with allegedly corrupt state
regulators. Defendants sought dismissal for failure of the plaintiff to make
demand on the board, which as the case law had developed, required
particularized facts giving rise to a doubt that most of the board members
had reason to fear unexculpated liability. The majority read the factual
allegations as falling short of bad faith or willing acquiescence and dismissed
the case under the demand-required rubric. Believing instead that there was
enough evidence for this stage of the proceeding, Chief Justice Strine made
his feelings amply known:
It may be that after the daylight of discovery shines for some time,
the rancid whiff that arises from the pled facts dissipates and turns
into the bracing freshness of a new Carolina day. But, without
that, the off-putting odor will linger and so too will rational
suspicions that the defendants caused the smell. 3
My contribution to this festschrift focuses on the cultural dimension to
both the commission and prevention of corporate crime and the judicial
response in Caremark-type cases, inspired by some of Strine’s recent postjudicial writings. Corporate case law in Delaware exhibits something of an
acoustic separation between holding and dicta, so that judicial opinions
frequently chastise the officers and directors charged with wrongdoing even
as they make amply clear that no punishment will be handed out. Mel
Eisenberg offered up this observation long ago, 4 and Ed Rock famously
elaborated on how the shaming function of this judicial rhetoric works, 5 via
morality tales in the cases before it that call out the greedy and the disloyal.
The assumption is that lawyers gather, interpret, and then impart these
narratives to their clients, which generates normative improvement in

to put in place a system of compliance monitoring. Variations on Caremark involve claims
that the board failed to act appropriately in the response to evidence of a compliance failure
(red flag cases), or—worse—knowingly acquiesced in and thus contributed to unlawful
behavior. Birmingham Retirement & Relief Systems v. Good was the latter kind of case. For
an excellent recent survey, see Roy Shapira, A New Caremark Era: Causes and Consequences,
98 WASH. U.L. REV. 1857 (2021); see also Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Oversight and
Disobedience, 72 VAND. L. REV. 2013 (2019).
3. Birmingham, 177 A.3d at 69 (Del. 2017).
4. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Are All Risks Created Equal? Rethinking the Distinction
Between Legal and Business Risk in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437 (1993).
5. Edward Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Delaware Corporate Law Works, 44 UCLA
L. REV. 1009 (1997); cf. David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
1811 (2001).
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corporate governance. This is a form of “soft law.” 6
I have never been quite convinced that soft law works as neatly or as
frequently as just described. But I do believe that judges who take advantage
of this separation want to be in a cultural conversation with the lawyers
reading the cases as to their own spheres of influence, taking advantage of
the distinctive norms of the legal profession and (crucially) lawyers’
realization that the indeterminate nature of Delaware corporate law found in
both holdings and dicta is an immense and profitable privilege. They listen,
carefully, even to dissents. Judges with the right reputational capital can stay
settled in this role even after retirement. This is one source from which soft
corporate law emerges—aspirational demands not legally enforceable (or
above and beyond the legally enforced).
My essay takes as a start Strine’s insistent attitude toward lawabidingness in corporate law and corporate governance as expressed in two
recent law review articles. The first (written with two junior co-authors) is
Caremark and ESG, Perfect Together, 7 which sends a very clear-sounding
message on the connections among law, ethics, and social responsibility. In
the second, Strine has collaborated with my colleague Chris Brummer on
Duty and Diversity, to address the fraught subjects of diversity, equity and
inclusion in corporations. Both articles draw from a mutually reinforcing
mix of hard and soft law. 8 Both also invoke “culture” as playing a key
explanatory role but stop well short of explaining how or when. So, my
contribution here is to move the study of corporate culture a few steps
forward by showing its ability to frustrate messages of law-abidingness in
many corporate settings.
The expressive power of soft law is open to question for many possible
reasons. Judges, scholars, and others interested in corporate crime have
offered many explanations, most tending toward conventional agency costs,
which implies some kind of in personam greed or corruption that sneers at
voluntary compliance. An alternative of increasing academic and practical
interest is a cultural explanation: the presence of a deeply-rooted belief
system that somehow deflects or distorts compliance messages to weaken
internal legal controls and restraints. While that seems to be a difference of

6. Specifically on Caremark, see Claire Hill, Caremark as Soft Law, 90 TEMPLE L. REV.
681, 682 (2018). The author of the Caremark opinion, the legendary Chancellor William
Allen, explored the idea in an article of his own, Realigning the Standard of Review of
Director Due Care with Delaware Public Policy, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 449 (2002).
7. Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Caremark and ESG, Perfect Together: A Practical Approach
to Implementing an Integrated, Efficient Caremark and EESG Strategy, 106 IOWA L. REV.
1885 (2021).
8. Chris Brummer & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Duty and Diversity, 75 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2022).
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opinion between economists and sociologists, that methodological
distinction has all but collapsed. As put in a recent paper on corporate
cultures by economists Gary Gorton, Jillian Grennan, and Alexander
Zentefis, the agency cost paradigm “ignore[s] the possibility that managers
are essentially well-intentioned people operating in a complex and uncertain
environment.” 9 While cultural accounts are notoriously hard to test
rigorously, economists like Gorton et al. have made fascinating progress in
that direction. To focus in, this essay addresses what we are learning about
the nature and source of so-called “risk cultures,” i.e., those with norms
celebrating aggressive risk-taking and denigrating the appearance of
excessive caution. Shifting from greed to risk perception as a way of
understanding some kinds of corporate cultures require different ways of
structuring and communicating legal messages, which will bring us right
back to Strine and his soft law messaging.
I. RISK CULTURES
In the social science literature, there is no end to squabbling about the
nature or essence of culture, corporate or otherwise. Eric van den Steen
defines corporate culture as “the degree to which members have similar
beliefs about the best way of doing things,” 10 which is as good a starting
point as any. In sociology and anthropology, there is no necessary function
played by cultural artifacts and institutions; often, they generate false
normative belief-systems (e.g., shareholder primacy) to perpetuate power
imbalances. In contrast, as economists like Van den Steen have warmed up
to corporate culture as a useful construct, they have naturally sought causal
relationships back and forth between culture and success (or failure), or in
the longer run, perhaps, between culture and survival (or demise). As Gorton
et al. stress, one move among economists is informational and explanatory:
9. Gary B. Gorton, Jillian Grennan & Alexander K. Zentefis, Corporate Culture 2 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 29322, Oct. 20, 2021), https://www
.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w29322/w29322.pdf [https://perma.cc/WV6V-RP8
P]; see also Quentin Dupont & Jonathan Karpoff, The Trust Triangle: Laws, Reputation, and
Culture in Empirical Finance Research, 163 J. BUS. ETHICS 217 (2020); Edward Rock &
Michael Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms and the Self-Governing
Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619 (2001). I have emphasized this in much of my work.
E.g., DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE, SELLING RISK: CORPORATIONS, WALL STREET
AND THE DILEMMAS OF INVESTOR PROTECTION 40–42 (2016); Donald C. Langevoort, Cultures
of Compliance, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 933 (2017); Donald C. Langevoort, Opening the Black
Box of Corporate Culture in Law and Economics, 162 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL
ECON. 80 (2005).
10. Eric Van den Steen, Culture Clash: The Costs and Benefits of Homogeneity, 56
MGMT. SCI. 1718, 1718 (2010).
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corporate cultures generate the kind of coherence in interpreting competitive
conditions that make coordinated strategic behavior more likely. Another is
motivational: those same beliefs become shared, they can encourage the
trust, optimism, and entrepreneurial spirit that make competitive success
more likely, or the bickering, pessimism, and risk aversion that make it less
likely. 11 On average, the former is more likely to be rewarded in competitive
markets, the latter punished. But reality doesn’t always yield the expected.
As to compliance with law, the causal connections are especially
complicated. To be sure, cultures heading toward failure can incite lawbreaking born of fear, anxiety, and anger—the infamous “last-period
problem” in conventional principal-agent accounts of economic behavior.
However, of just as much interest are adaptive cultures that promote success
in hyper-competitive settings, both internally and externally. It turns out that
many of the cognitive behaviors that executive recruiters covet (confidence
especially, and quick competitive arousal) are risk factors vis-à-vis
compliance. Not surprisingly, some of the worst compliance shocks arise in
firms that were on a steadily accelerating success trajectory, only to hit a
sudden reversal—finding themselves facing adversity (whether the world yet
knows about it) within a firm culture primed to deny failure. That includes
Enron, WorldCom, Wells Fargo, and so many others.
In their very helpful survey of the contemporary economic approach to
corporate culture, Gorton et al. highlight risk cultures, i.e., how taste for risk
emerges and grows stronger or weaker over time. (Many of the studies they
feature arise from the great financial crisis of a decade ago, with immense
variation in the risky behaviors of different financial institutions). Their
main claim is that risk-taking is observed in the field in ways that cannot be
explained empirically by normal economic incentives, which they thus
attribute to culture. 12 Such cultures necessarily generate attitudes about how
to construe risk and value or devalue aggressive risk-taking.
How do such risk cultures take root and grow? Consider briefly four
possibilities:

11. See Luigi Guiso et al., The Value of Corporate Culture, 117 J. FIN. ECON. 60 (2015);
Donald C. Langevoort, The Effects of Shareholder Primacy, Publicness, and “Privateness”
on Corporate Cultures, 43 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 377 (2020).
12. The paradigmatic kind of correlation is between executives’ taste for thrill-seeking
and the incidence of wrongdoing at the corporate level. See Robert Davidson et al.,
Executives’ “Off-the-Job” Behavior, Corporate Culture, and Financial Reporting Risk, 117
J. FIN. ECON. 5 (2015). Other traits that match up with risky or conservative corporate level
choices include religious orientation, political affiliation, geography, marital infidelity, and
age, among others.
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A. Founding Narratives about Risk
Like institutions in so many settings, corporations have foundation
stories, often mythical, about how they came to succeed (the failures having
fallen out of sight and mind). The lessons of the founders are handed down
through group rituals and ceremonies and become path dependent as new
leaders and followers are recruited in the image of those who came before.13
Courage, persistence, aggressiveness, and the like tend to constitute the
content of these narratives. These understandings become performative, and
when successful become celebrated as proof-text for the validity of the
internal norms, while failures are rationalized away.
B. Risk Selection
This is key: risk is, on average, rewarded. To be sure, the aggressive
risk-taker has a higher chance of failing as well, but spread over many
iterations, there will be lucky (or skilled) people who take credit for a run of
successes, and gain power and influence as a result. They survive and
prosper to tell their stories, while the losers disappear. A great deal of work
in psychology points to the adaptive nature of this bias, on an individual and
group level. Winners gain self-confidence (often, overconfidence), which
enhances their motivation; gain followers by being evangelists for risktaking; and display traits that become self-fulfilling, making them more
persistent, persuasive, and influential as they climb the corporate ladder.
C. The Neuroscience of Collective Risk-taking
Competitive arousal is a well-studied phenomenon in the willingness to
take risks, giving positive hormonal feedback and prompting further
aggressiveness that makes success more likely. 14 The winners generate their
own myths, ones that often tie back to older foundation mythology. New
hires to the firm—and those promoted—will tend to resemble and then
reinforce the risk attitudes embedded in the prevailing interpretations. The
tribal initiation rites and bonding experiences common in so many businesses
help spread the beliefs.

13. See Edgar Schein, The Role of the Founder in Creating Organizational Culture, 12
ORG. DYNAMICS 13 (1983).
14. Deepak Malhotra, The Desire to Win: The Effects of Competitive Arousal on
Motivation and Behavior, 111 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 139 (2010).
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D. Risk Networks
All the foregoing combines to gradually shift power to the winners in
the corporate promotion tournament, which powerful cultural consequences.
As like-minded persons gain power, they reinforce the beliefs about risk and
serve as gatekeepers to preserve and propagate those attitudes. Todd Haugh
offers an interesting account of the Wells Fargo scandal and the emergence
and movement of a network of key players who ultimately created the
opportunities for the illicit practices to grow out of control. 15
None of the foregoing predicts endless success for any business
enterprise. But for a time, and with luck for quite a while, aggressive risk
cultures can be very powerful and success-inducing, especially in good times
when negative feedback happens less frequently. Of course, there will also
be times when conservatism is rewarded (again, as a result of skill or luck)
and becomes part of the firm’s belief system. But the competitive rewards
in terms of the trappings of success—which have their own cultural
valence—will be more salient in boom times.
E. Cultural Filtration
The point so far is that some—by no means all—cultures validate risktaking in a powerful way, enabling and giving legitimacy to aggressiveness,
shunning caution. This is both perceptual and normative. Displays of
confidence build on traits that diminish risk perception, instilling a genuine
sense of control that makes a risky action seem justifiable. “Groupishness”
primes the organizational audience to applaud the successes and demand
more. 16 Threats to the culture are resisted.
These shared beliefs about risk can be functional whether accurate or
not. Imagine a culture of caution, fed by anxiety, doubt, and paralysis.
Getting consensus on forward-looking action is more difficult; motivation
thus diminishes. The opposite is, though not all the time, competitively fit if
for no other reason its ability to push aside the negativity. Gorton et al. cite
survey evidence that executives recognize these alternative directions and
worry more about too little risk-taking embedded in the culture than too
much.
15. See Todd Haugh, The Power Few of Corporate Compliance, 53 GA. L. REV. 129
(2018) (discussing the Wells Fargo scandal and the key players who created the opportunity
for the illegal practices to grow).
16. See Jesse Kluver et al., Behavioral Ethics for Homo Economicus, Homo Heuristicus,
and Homo Duplex, 123 ORG. BEHAVIOR & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 150, 154 (2015)
(discussing ethical behavior in organizations).
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II. LEGAL RISK TAKING
This last section was intentionally written to be generic about the kind
of risk being taken—risk cultures are hardly the only form of corporate
culture—though hopefully I’ve shown why they might be especially strong.
Now it is time to bring Leo Strine back on stage and return to legal risk. In
risk cultures, is legal risk just another form of risk deserving of the same
attitudes (aggressiveness, etc.), or distinctive in terms of nature and
appropriate policy?
The standard legal response is exceptionalism, as Chief Justice Strine
forcefully insisted in his dissent in City of Birmingham. Intentional lawbreaking of any sort is ultra vires, with no business judgment excuses.
Caremark extends this to an obligation for boards to take legal risk seriously
even without current awareness of actual illegality, and its sibling application
focuses the duty (though still leaving it as a bad faith inquiry) when there are
red flags waiving in directors’ faces. Business risks—even large ones that
put an entire company at risk—do not get the same treatment. Other
corporate law scholars have grappled with the nature and consequences of
this exceptionalism. Elizabeth Pollman set the contemporary argument in
motion by assessing the rule of law in firms that deliberately shun forms of
law-abidingness in the name of creative destruction; 17 a work-in-progress by
Gideon Parchomovsky and Adi Libson develops an elaborate version of how
the distinction between legal risk and business risk (and the law’s demands
thereto) could be made even more imperative; 18 and Jennifer Arlen and
Lewis Kornhauser critique the idea that expressive law can substitute in any
meaningful way for forced law-abidance. And this is just a sampling. There
are significant scholarly literatures dealing with this dualism in law and
society, 19 white collar crime, and professional responsibility research, in turn
drawing from psychology, organizational behavior, neuroscience, and
finance, among other disciplines.
Few corporate officers or directors would say they disagree that clear
legal commands are an imperative, business risk a choice. But the cultural
filter may deflect or distort both the perceived definition and legitimacy of

17. See Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Disobedience, 68 DUKE L.J. 709 (2019)
(discussing a culture of exceptionalism in work environments).
18. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Adi Libson, Are All Risks Created Equal? Rethinking
The Distinction Between Legal and Business Risk in Corporate Law, 102 B.U. L. REV.
(forthcoming, 2022) (discussing the difference between legal and business risk).
19. Work by sociologists on the diffusion of legal rules inside the corporation are
foundational to our understanding of organizational cultures. E.g., Lauren Edelman, Legal
Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures, 9 ACAD. MGT. REV. 1531 (1992).
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law abidingness that brings about individual and group behaviors that treat
legal risk more the same than different. It is that to which Strine is reacting
so vehemently. There are three main social forces behind the deflection and
distortion. The first is legal indeterminacy.20 Law is creative, as is its
interpretation. Risk cultures are adept, I suspect, at construing legal demands
through the lens of motivated inference, thereby lightening the gray areas.
This, in turn, is abetted by the legal actors who buy in to the risk-taking
culture. Both in-house and in law firms, lawyers gain power by stressing the
constructive rather than nay-saying part of their advice practice. Consider a
“winner take all” promotion tournament among three types of lawyers:
aggressive risk-takers, mildly cautious ones, and the risk averse. Over many
iterations, the winners (for reasons noted earlier) will likely be the lucky risktakers, who will appear as more skilled and thus gain power as the game goes
on. Because they fit in with the risk-taking ethos already embedded in the
culture, they will be the favorites of the non-lawyers who watch with interest,
including the corporate leadership. 21 This bias increases considerably if this
competition for status, power, and pay is happening when law—for whatever
reason—is underenforced. The payoff to aggressive risk taking is that much
larger. Fortune favors the brave, as they say.
A third trope is denigration: the ability of the culture to construe even
the more determinate of legal requirements as illegitimate—the work
product of self-serving partisan political actors or pointy-headed bureaucrats,
for example. This feeds the belief that regulation has little or no moral force,
especially if it stands in the way of creative destruction that brings on a better
world. Anyone who spends time among influential actors in highly regulated
industries soon picks up the subtle cues of a shared belief that law and its
enforcement are obstacles, like so many business risks that need a creative
work-around. One recent firm memo on compliance caught this point:
Managers and employees may be cynical about the extreme shifts
in enforcement policy that seem to change in administration. It’s
the ‘I’ve seen this movie before’ attitude that can disincentivize
management or employee buy-in. The board should anticipate this
cynicism and move vigorously to ensure that the organization’s
culture remains committed to ethical conduct and to legal

20. See Yuval Feldman & Doron Teichman, Are All Legal Probabilities Created Equal?,
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 980 (2009) (discussing legal indeterminacy).
21. See Donald C. Langevoort, Getting (Too) Comfortable: In-house Lawyers,
Enterprise Risk, and the Financial Crisis, 2012 WISC. L. REV. 495 (discussing risk taking
behavior and its effect on business clients).
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compliance. That may not be an easy task. 22
We have gone this far just to make the same point, and explain why,
legal actors—whether legislators, regulators, judges, or practicing lawyers
who advise clients—will be frustrated that the messages they wish to impart
about law-abidingness do not survive the cultural filter that prizes risktaking. This is not the first article to make this point, or to delve deeply into
cultural or alternative explanations for the distorted (but probably genuinely
believed) rejection of legal exceptionalism to the larger category of business
risk-taking. But it does get us back to Caremark and Strine’s frustration,
which we can now take on directly.
III. THE CAREMARK CONNECTION
In the Caremark/ESG article cited earlier, Strine connects the dots
among three main ideas: (1) the imperative of obedience to the law, in letter
and spirit; (2) Caremark’s basic oversight requirement; and (3) the ESG (or
stakeholder protection) movement in corporate governance. The first is what
we have been addressing, for which a system should be in place that seeks
ethical commitment as a precautionary device:
Think about it this way. If directors are seeking to go beyond the
legal minimum and to treat all the corporation’s stakeholders and
communities of impact in an ethical and considerate manner, the
corporation is by definition minimizing the risk of breaking the
law. . . . [T]he corporation will have a margin of error that keeps
it largely out of the legal grey and create a reputation that will serve
the company well with its stakeholders and regulators when there
is a situational lapse. 23
An exemplary Caremark system is the means to a system that faces up
to this combination of legal and ethical demands, which is fostered by having
a board of directors and board committee structure with the expertise to
integrate ESG data collection and compliance oversight with genuine law
abidingness.
This is an ambitious charge; our task here is to identify the justification
for it and to think through its likely efficacy in a high risk-taking corporate
culture. Here, we come back to the acoustic separation—this is far more

22. Michael Peregrine, Directors Challenged to Respond to New DOJ Corporate Fraud
Initiative, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Dec. 13, 2021), https://corpgov
.law.harvard.edu/2021/12/13/directors-challenged-to-respond-to-new-doj-corporate-fraudinitiative/ [https://perma.cc/G9BK-FD43] (discussing the new BOJ corporate fraud initiative).
23. Strine et al., supra note 7, at 1909.
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than the Caremark line of cases demands in terms of actual liability threat to
officers or directors. Doctrinally, the legal standard here is good faith in
seeking what is best for the corporation and its shareholders, which connotes
a subjective attitude of loyalty and due concern on the part of the board.
Here, is the same idea expressed by Strine and Brummer:
From this standpoint, corporate law’s fiduciary duty of compliance
is not only important as a matter of ‘hard’ law enforced by the
threat of corporate and personal liability. It also defines as
normative “soft” law what fiduciaries are expected by corporate
law to do, legal expectations that go beyond what fiduciaries can
be held liable for in damages and that require them to protect the
corporation from the financial, management, and reputational
consequences that come when a corporation fails to comply with
critical legal duties. . . . 24
Because of the minimal hard law risk, most of the force here is
aspirational and thus presumptively weaker. Nothing in the more recent
Barnhill 25 revision to the Caremark doctrine raises the personal liability risk
all that much, even as it adds the insistence that boards demand to be notified
promptly of all legal red flags associated with corporate functions that are
“mission critical.” Indeed, there is a largely concealed message that cuts the
other way. The recent Boeing case is probably the Delaware courts’ most
assertive application of the duty of good faith regarding mission critical
activities, 26 settled in November 2021 for an eye-popping $227.5 million.
When announced, the accompanying media coverage indicated this sum was
to be paid by the directors and the D&O insurer.27 Soon, however, perhaps
because some lawyer melted down upon sensing the half-truth, the reference
to the directors having to pay disappeared. I have little doubt that the director
culture understands that this is a no-threat doctrine, which may be a more
salient message to them than anything else in the Caremark doctrine.
So, we turn to the soft or expressive power of a message like the one
Strine et al. want to promote. What it is, essentially, is the precautionary
principle in Caremark (or oversight) garb—in the face of uncertainty about
legal demands, be cautious. This puts ethics to work as the basis for the
“margin of error” they want to build into the system of internal legal controls.
24. Brummer & Strine, supra note 8, at 7.
25. Marchand v. Berryhill Inc., 212 A.2d 805 (Del. 2019).
26. In re Boeing Co. Deriv. Litig., 2021 WL 4059934 (Del. Ch., Sept. 7, 2021).
27. Linda Chiem, Boeing Board Inks $238M Deal to End 737 Max Derivative Suit,
LAW360, (November 5, 2021, 10:12 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1438180/boeingboard-inks-238m-deal-to-end-737-max-derivative-suit [https://perma.cc/H7ZJ-PE2W].
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But a deeply felt risk culture wants no part of such reticence, and is ready to
denigrate, filter, or distort the message to protect the chosen way of seeing
things.
This relates to a commonplace idea in the world of compliance controls,
well beyond Caremark and the duty of good faith. It is often said that good
compliance begins with the right “tone at the top,” even if tone is necessarily
a soft strategy. And it is correct in one sense: that a cynical or garbled tone
at the top will be destructive to both compliance and ethics. But the converse
does not follow. A good tone rings hollow if at odds with the prevailing risk
culture.
IV. DIVERSITY IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
In separate work cited earlier, Strine has extended his thinking about
governance to the essential issue of diversity along multiple dimensions.
This is a hot topic, with social, political, and economic (empirical)
controversy about both hard and soft strategies to alter discriminatory
corporate power structures. A short essay like this cannot be comprehensive
in engaging the subject. Suffice it to say that Strine and Brummer make an
extensive argument that there is a duty of loyalty basis for saying that
attention to diversity and inclusion is required, much of it in the soft law
sense:
As a matter of fiduciary duty, therefore, corporate leaders not only
have broad authority to promote an inclusive and diverse corporate
culture, their affirmative obligation to act in the best interests of
the corporation can be understood to require it, given the
important legal requirements for corporations to avoid invidious
discrimination and growing societal and investor expectations that
business will contribute to reducing racial and gender inequality. 28
They are using the word “require” not in the sense that the law will
punish the leaders for failing to take such affirmative action but rather as a
claim that the dangers facing a corporation that fails to do so is so great that
a fiduciary complicit in that failure should be ashamed even if he or she finds
the solution to any litigation personally painless. It invites criticism that
should be voiced loudly and openly, without mincing words, as in the City
of Birmingham dissent.
The risk culture idea developed earlier has some purchase in
understanding the current controversies as well. One of the tricks that
cultural filters play is to reframe issues in ways that cohere with preferred
28. Brummer & Strine, supra note 8, at 5.

2022]

SOFT LAW, RISK CULTURES, AND LAW ABIDINGNESS

831

beliefs; if openness to risk is embedded in the culture, then—perhaps
unconsciously—the corporate belief system will interpret board and
executive diversity initiatives as a proxy for risk preference reform. There
is a large literature about different risk-taking preferences along racial,
ethnic, gender, and other lines, the lessons from which are quite complicated.
To be sure, there is more to the story than a taste for risk. Any culture
driven by competitive arousal is bound to have second-order effects on
gender discrimination and patriarchal power structures. A recent finance
paper adds texture by seeking to correlate the incidence of employment
discrimination lawsuits with a variety of potential explanations, including
corporate governance, changes in firms’ competitive environment,
governance strategies, and financial resources. 29 The rate of litigation
implies much more stickiness in what is driving the apparent steady
incidence of discrimination, which the authors ascribe to corporate culture
and its reinforced beliefs about privilege.
V. CONCLUSION: CULTURALLY ASTUTE LAWYERING
Leo Strine’s insistence on a strong norm of law abidingness—letter and
spirit—may seem natural and normal to many, especially those deeply
acculturated into the legal profession’s belief system, but it is not. In
corporate cultures, the prized norm is more likely to embrace bold, strategic
thinking, with a taste for risk. Soft law messages from judges and the like
readily become garbled or distorted in too many business settings, if they are
heard at all, diminishing any sense of guilt or shame when the law is demoted
as a priority. These cultures develop a hard protective coating, hard to break
through.
I said at the outset that I doubted that soft law works as well as its
enthusiasts think. It is unrealistic to think that busy, driven, businesspeople
pay much attention to messages that lack a strong and relatively certain bite,
or that the intermediaries who translate hard and soft threats—i.e., practicing
lawyers—are particularly good at penetrating the cultures’ rationalizations.
Yet corporate law finds so many ways to soften the hard threats, creating
more a sense of autonomy than the pull of obedience. I find Strine’s soft law
claims compelling, but those who matter probably never hear them because
of the background noise high velocity cultures generate.
29. Casey Dougal et al., Corporate Discrimination, Competition and Shareholder Wealth
(Nov. 19, 2021) (unpublished manuscript), https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3967456; see
Vicki L. Bogan et al., What Drives Racial Diversity on U.S. Corporate Boards? (Oct. 29,
2021) (unpublished manuscript), https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3952897 (evaluating an
empirical assessment of progress or lack thereof in racial diversity).
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Of particular concern is law’s legitimacy, which is easy for lawyers to
assume but is challenged regularly in corporations as biased, ill-conceived,
and undeserving of respect, leaving only fear if there is really something to
worry about. And often enough, corporate lawyers and lobbyists can make
the worries go away, leaving little left to gain their attention or tug on their
consciences. Lawyers acting as counsellors give in, and give up, unless they
have a hard threat to dangle in front of directors and senior executives.
This is a familiar lament, I realize. Inevitably, there is some matching
going on, so that lawyers chosen by corporations with a risk-taking or
diversity-averse orientation come willing and able to concentrate their advice
on the ideas that are already privileged. But I accept the admonitions of
Strine and colleagues that the sands are shifting, and that persistent shortfalls
in living up to society’s expectations can accumulate into something much
more serious than a deferred prosecution agreement or Caremark-based
derivative suit. To be sure, the evidence is usually mixed, and not every
demand for some form of social commitments is well thought through, or
unbiased politically or financially. The lawyer as cultural translator should
be able to sort things through, with some familiarity with evidence and
sources. For too many reasons that can be counted here, perceived
performance on social responsibility has financial payoffs both good and
bad, 30 and a corporation’s ability to dissemble about its record lessens in a
connected world.
So, there are lessons to be learned for those who are willing to be
acolytes for the kind of soft law that fills in the gaps and holes that
incompletely formulated or enforced hard law creates. The lessons are about
blind spots in corporate cultures, as well as blind spots of our own. Is it naïve
to think that there are lawyers out there anxious to try? In fact, there is an
ever-growing body of empirical work correlating structural lawyer attributes
with client law-abidingness or other public-regarding outcomes, offering
interesting evidence of lawyers doing their jobs well, with good outcomes.31

30. See Karl Lins, Henri Servaes & Ane Tamayo, Social Capital, Trust, and Firm
Performance: The Value of Corporate Social Responsibility during the Financial Crisis, 72
J. FIN. 1785, (2017) (discussing the financial payoffs for perceived social responsibility).
31. See Stavros Gadinis & Amelia Miazod, The Hidden Power of Compliance, 103 MINN.
L. REV. 2135, (2019). Two good recent surveys of this empirical evidence are Vikramaditya
Khanna, An Analysis of Internal Governance and the Role of the General Counsel in Reducing
Corporate Crime, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE CRIME AND FINANCIAL
MISDEALING 282, 282 (Jennifer Arlen ed., 2018), and Sung Hui Kim, Do Lawyers Make Good
Gatekeepers?, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF INVESTOR PROTECTION (Arthur Laby ed.,
forthcoming 2021).
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The cynicism that it isn’t worth trying may be what is truly naïve. 32
Moreover, I think that a fleshed-out vision of soft corporate law has
intellectual heft and value as well as aspirational.33 Over the long arc of
Delaware law on fiduciary responsibility and the availability of remedies, we
seem to be trending downward in insistence on fiduciary virtue.34 The
courts’ pragmatic explanations are many: concerns about the judiciary’s
institutional competence, fear of risk aversion, distaste for excessive
litigation, the just desserts to shareholders who voted the alleged wrongdoers
into office, etc. And as we have seen, these anxieties now extend to potential
litigation in a world more open to stakeholder rights and remedies, including
law abidingness. If only for the lawyers who transmit the messages into the
cultural channel, there is virtue in thinking deeply about what fiduciary
obligation and good citizenship should mean shorn of all those protections.
The answers may not always be clear, but Leo Strine’s writings are good
texts for starting that journey.

32. See Donald C. Langevoort, Gatekeepers, Cultural Captives or Knaves? Corporate
Lawyers through Different Lenses, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1683 (2020) (describing how the
cynicism towards attorneys trying to do their jobs well is detrimental).
33. See Julian Velasco, The Role of Aspiration in Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 54 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 519 (2012) (explaining the value a fleshed-out version of soft corporate law
can bring).
34. See James Cox & Randall Thomas, Delaware’s Retreat, 42 DEL. J. CORP. L. 323
(2018) (describing in detail the downward trend in fiduciary duty insistence).

